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Abstract 
European-wide data concerning both companies and 
households indicate that the credit rationing phenomenon, 
which has been predicted by theory, does in fact occur to a 
significant degree in the European credit market. Among 
SMEs, micro companies are most vulnerable and the current 
economic crisis has only made these concerns more 
pressing. Top-down use of the monetary transmission 
mechanism alone is insufficient to counter the problem. The 
other solution consists of a bottom-up, microeconomic 
stimulation of lending transactions, by focusing on collateral 
and guarantees. The data confirm the high importance that 
lenders – especially individual households and micro 
companies – attach to collateral and guarantees when 
making their lending decisions. As a consequence, we would 
argue that those parts of the law governing security 
interests and guarantees should be one of the primary 
targets for government policy aimed at improving credit 
flows, especially in avoiding a conflict between consumer 
protection measures and laws on surety and guarantees. 
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Introduction 
Insufficient credit availability, known in economic literature as credit rationing, is a form 
of market failure caused by adverse selection. The effects of this failure are potentially 
extremely damaging for a well-functioning economy. If the European economy were a 
body, the system of credit would be the arteries, as it is often pictured, and credit 
rationing would represent dangerous blood clots. Restrictions to credit flow are felt first 
and foremost by small economic actors, mainly households and micro, small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). 
This policy brief firstly aims to give an overview of the problem of credit rationing and 
show that low-income households and SMEs are most concerned by the phenomenon. 
Focusing solely on loans as a way of financing and on the issues related to access to 
finance of micro and small companies as well households, it then sketches possible 
solutions focused on guarantees. 
This paper brings together data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and 
Consumption survey (HFCS), Eurostat, and both the latest wave of the extended biennial 
EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance of SMEs (EC/ECB SAFE 2013) and the latest wave 
of the smaller semi-annual ECB SAFE Survey, covering the period between October 2012 
and March 2013.  
Credit rationing in theory and practice 
In an ordinary market, supply and demand are brought together by the price. The credit 
market, however, is not an ordinary market, but one characterised by adverse selection. 
This is predominantly due to two reasons. The first is the key importance of information 
about borrower risk, and its asymmetric dispersion across credit market players. The 
second is the effect of the price on that risk. Since the price affects the risk being at the 
core of the transaction, credit markets cannot be entirely cleared.1  
The adverse selection quality of the credit market becomes apparent when looking at 
the negative effects of allowing interest rates to rise under market influence. Rising 
interest rates will reduce the quality of the pool of borrowers by pushing out low-risk, 
low-yield borrowers and attracting riskier borrowers instead. Higher prices will also 
change the behaviour of the borrowers, as their profit margins are reduced, pushing 
them to projects with a lower probability of success but with higher payoffs when 
successful. As a consequence, paradoxical though this may sound, past a certain point, 
                                                            
1 D. Jaffee and T. Russel (1976), “Imperfect information, uncertainty and credit rationing”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4, p. 651; J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit rationing in markets with 
imperfect information”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, p. 393. 
The relevance of 
credit rationing 
Outline of this 
policy brief 
Use of data 
Two main causes of 
credit market failure 
and of credit 
rationing 
The effects of interest 
rates on credit risk 
and subsequent profit 
paradoxes 
3  
net returns to the bank can actually decrease with rising interest rates, because the 
default losses may rise faster than the increased interest income.2 
In order to protect themselves and the credit market from the adverse selection carousel 
of rising prices and ever worsening quality of borrowers and decreasing net returns, 
banks limit the supply of credit and offer this credit at a low interest rate. As a 
consequence, demand will exceed supply without the price being able to help, causing 
the market to fail in order to function.  
These theoretical claims are supported by empirical data concerning both households 
and SMEs. According to the HFCS data, 8.1% of European households were credit 
constrained to some degree in the three years preceding the survey.3 The situation for 
SMEs is much worse, with 31% being actively credit constrained in the six months 
leading up to the SAFE survey of 2013, in addition to the 5−7% of SMEs that did not even 
apply for various types of financing, assuming they would be rejected anyway.4 In 
contrast, only 15% of large companies reported similar difficulties.5 Eurostat data 
confirm this picture, with SMEs’ success rates in obtaining loan finance having declined 
between 2007 and 2010.6 
 
 
                                                            
2 Stiglitz and Weiss, op. cit., pp. 396 and 401. 
3 ECB (2013a), The Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey – Results from the first wave, 
ECB Statistics Paper Series No. 2, April, p. 101 (www.ecb.europa.eu). This number is based on observations 
that do not necessarily cover all countries, without any treatment for missing values.  
4 European Commission (2013), SME’s access to finance 2013, Analytical report, 14 November, p. 27 et seq. 
(at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/data/#h2-1). 
5 These data were collected for the period between October 2012 and March 2013, see ECB (2013b), Survey 
on the access to finance of small and medium-sized enterprises in the euro area. October 2012 to March 
2013, p. 15. Data partially accessible at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9138811. 
6 Data available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_business/data/database 
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The extent of externally imposed credit constraints is greatest by far among the micro 
companies and the inversed correlation becomes weaker beyond this category sector 
(see Figure 1). The full rejection rate is over three times higher for micro companies than 
for small ones, but companies are rationed in the amount across all sizes. 
 
SMEs, and especially micro firms, are aware of their low capacity for obtaining finance, 
which leads a significant proportion of companies seeking credit to not apply for it 
because they think their application would be rejected, thus self-constraining their 
access to credit. The number of possible rejections therefore does not fully illustrate the 
problem of insufficient access to finance; it is an even larger problem more anchored on 
micro firms. As Figure 2 shows, among the micro companies the likelihood of not 
applying for credit due to possible rejection is almost six times higher than for large 
companies. 
SMEs do in fact recognise their predicament, as access to finance was named the 
dominant concern for the future by the second largest percentage of respondents in the 
EC/ECB SAFE 2013 study, surpassed only by finding customers. Large companies are less 
worried about access to finance, which is consistent with their above-mentioned much 
lower credit constraint rate.7 
                                                            
7 ECB (2013b), op. cit., p. 5 (www.ecb.europa.eu). 
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Credit is an important fuelling force for the economy. Low availability of credit therefore 
hampers economic recovery,8 as it both household consumption9 and denies companies 
part of the financial means they need in order to function. This strong interaction 
between a country’s general economic performance and the severity of credit 
constraints is also apparent from the data. While German SMEs reported, on balance, an 
increase in the availability of bank loans (+6%), the deterioration in Greece (-47%) and 
Italy (-35%) was alarming. 10  
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Collateral and access to finance of SMEs 
A portion of SMEs needing guarantees in order to get finance of 26% in 2007, rising to 
28% in 2010, seems significant, especially given the fact that three quarters of these 
guarantees were provided by the owners or directors of the business (see Figure 3 
above). This means that about 20% of SMEs must agree to what effectively amounts to 
piercing the corporate veil for the benefit of specific creditors.11  
                                                             
8 G. Dell’Ariccia, E. Detragiache and R. Rajan (2008), “The real effect of banking crises”, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol. 17, p. 96. 
9 Seminal work in this respect was performed by M. Friedman (1957), A Theory of the Consumption Function, 
Princeton University Press and R. Hall (1978), “Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent income 
hypothesis: theory and evidence”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No. 6, pp. 971-987.  
10 European Commission, op. cit., p. 56 et seq. The numbers are net percentages, referring to the difference 
between the percentage of firms reporting an increase for the factor at hand and the percentage of those 
reporting a decrease.  
11 Access to finance statistics – Statistics explained, Eurostat, p. 5 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Access_to_finance_statistics#). 
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More detailed data on insufficient collateral for companies broken down by turnover 
offer even more insight (see Figure 4). As in other instances of credit constraints, the 
extent of the problem is indirectly correlated to the size of the company. The bigger the 
company, the lower the chance of quoting missing collateral or guarantee as the main 
obstacle in getting finance, signalling that collateral is more important for SMEs, as only 
companies with some financial constraints, among which SMEs are overrepresented, are 
plotted in the figure. 
This high importance of collateral for SMEs is partly explained by the fact that a credit 
rating is associated with higher access to finance than credit scoring. A credit rating not 
being widely accessible due to its cost would, however, be compensated by the 
information conveyance of collateral, significantly improving the access to finance for 
smaller companies. 
First, the reason why the granting of security interests in collateral might enable the 
lender to set the interest rate more accurately is that the risk of losses on the loan, to 
the extent that the debt is covered by collateral, is displaced by the evolution in value of 
that collateral, rather than remaining with the economic viability of the borrowing 
company, which can be harder for the lender to assess. Shifting risk to certain categories 
of assets allows lenders to enjoy the benefits of specialisation and centralisation.  
Second, collateral requirements also counteract the sorting effect of higher interest 
rates. Setting a particular interest rate has certain consequences in terms of the quality 
of the borrowers it attracts – higher interest rates attract higher risks.12 This is a 
consequence of the asymmetry between the payoff structures of lenders and borrowers; 
the borrower only cares about his payoffs when the project is successful, and this return 
is potentially unlimited, while any losses aren’t his to bear as they are wiped out by 
                                                            
12 H. Bester (1987), “The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information”, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, p. 894; Stiglitz and Weiss, op. cit., p. 393. 
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bankruptcy.13 The lender’s profit, on the other hand, consists only of the interest rate if 
the project is successful, yet he stands to lose the entire principal if it fails. Therefore, 
borrowers who have more risky projects in mind will not be dissuaded by the high 
interest rates, while low-risk borrowers will drop out as their low-yield projects won’t be 
able to sustain these high rates. Requiring collateral raises the stakes for borrowers by 
making sure that they will also bear some losses on default, reducing the asymmetry in 
payoffs and therefore improving the sorting of borrowers.  
The third benign effect collateral can have on credit rationing is the countervailing force 
it can exert on the incentive effects of the interest rate. Higher interest rates will change 
the behaviour of the borrower, pushing him towards more risky projects. This is another 
consequence of the asymmetry in payoffs mentioned above: borrowers can only gain 
from switching to riskier projects once the loan has been granted, as they enjoy all of the 
upside potential with none or only part of the downside risk. Under the right 
circumstances, collateral can be used to counteract this moral hazard by making riskier 
projects less attractive to the borrower, at the cost of less efficient risk-sharing.14 This is 
another example of how raising the stakes for the borrower can align his incentives with 
the interests of the lender.  
These second and third effects also find empirical support in the available data. The 
above-mentioned results on guarantee requirements for SMEs support the third effect 
as well as the first effect, as requiring guarantees from insiders who exert power over 
the company reduces the risk of moral hazard.  
Collateral’s second function of counteracting the sorting effect of the interest rate is 
consistent with the ECB SAFE data on SMEs. Only 17% (net) of euro area SMEs reported 
an increase in interest rates in 2013, down from 27% in 2010. This number however, 
hides considerable heterogeneity since German and French SMEs indicated a decline, 
while the majority of Spanish (66%) and Italian (62%) SMEs saw an increase in interest 
rates. Collateral requirements, on the other hand, have increased all over Europe for a 
net percentage of 35% of respondents, including in Germany (15%). The same evolution 
was observed for large firms, albeit to a lesser extent (22%).15 Eurostat data also confirm 
the importance banks and other lenders attach to collateral and to the existence of 
capital that they can seize.16  
                                                            
13 Lawyers will rightfully point out that the extent to which bankruptcy will wipe out losses depends on a 
number of factors, such as whether the debtor is a legal or natural person, possible directors’ liability issues, 
the amount of capital invested, etc. Relaxing the stylising assumption we have made here would, however, 
lead us too far off track, and would not refute the principle of asymmetric payoffs. 
14 Bester, op. cit., p. 896. 
15 ECB (2013b), op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
16 Access to finance statistics – Statistics explained, Eurostat, p. 4  
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Access_to_finance_statistics#) 
Discouraging 
excessive risk-taking 
Reducing moral 
hazard 
Rising need for 
collateral 
8  
Collateral and household lending 
Even though the HFCS survey on household consumption does not contain any direct 
data on collateral and guarantees, it does yield a number of interesting insights upon 
analysis. Given the more homogeneous capital structure of households compared to 
SMEs, and the general legal landscape concerning debt collection and insolvency law 
characterised by the possibility to seize debtor wealth in various forms as well as debtor 
income, a differentiated approach can be applied to households, separating the effects 
of income, net overall wealth and real estate wealth. This approach allows for more 
nuanced conclusions.  
When looking at the data, the first thing that becomes apparent is that there is a clear 
and statistically significant inverse relationship between net wealth, income and real 
estate wealth on the one hand, and credit constraints imposed by lenders on the other. 
These trends are consistent with theoretical predictions on the workings and importance 
of collateral and debt collection law. The ECB analysis confirms that the role of collateral 
is likely to be the connecting factor.17  
A second interesting observation is the apparent ability of European households to 
assess their own probability of success in obtaining credit, leading them to self-select. 
This self-selection takes place in a significant proportion of cases: while over 12% of the 
22.8% of households that applied for credit were refused by their lenders, another 6% of 
households considered applying for credit but refrained from doing so altogether, 
thinking they would be turned down (see Figure 5 below). These self-imposed 
constraints, based on households’ own assessments of their credit eligibility, therefore 
make up a large part of the total credit constraints faced by European households, and 
can only be made apparent through survey data such as the HFCS. A similar 
phenomenon can be observed in the data concerning SMEs, where 5−7% refrained from 
applying for various forms of bank credit on the assumption they would be refused.18  
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
                                                             
17 ECB (2013a), op. cit, p. 104. 
18 European Commission, op. cit., p. 27. 
19 Left column: Percentage of households that applied for but were refused in the past three years (data 
surveyed between 2008 and 2010 depending on country). Right column: Percentage of households that 
thought of applying for credit in the past three years, but considered they would be refused. Data apply to 
the whole euro area except Ireland and Finland due to non-response. 
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The significant scope of this phenomenon then begs the following question: How 
accurately do households predict their own ineligibility? Again, the same differentiated 
approach is required in order to come to a nuanced answer. When analysing the 
relationship between the three wealth factors and credit rationing, comparing external 
constraints with self-imposed ones, it becomes clear that, in general, self-selection is 
fairly accurate. Households understand that there is an inverse relationship between 
wealth in its various forms20 and credit eligibility, and even predict the course of this 
relationship relatively well. However, it appears that when it comes to the influence of 
income, the lower income deciles tend to underestimate their chances of obtaining 
credit.  
Figure 6. Imposed constraints by income deciles 
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
Figure 7.  Self-imposed constraints by income deciles 
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
Figure 8. Imposed constraints by net-wealth deciles 
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
Figure 9. Self-imposed constraints by net-wealth deciles 
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
 
                                                             
20 By this, we mean both current wealth, represented in the data by total net wealth and net real estate 
wealth, and wealth over time, i.e. income.  
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Figure 10. Imposed constraints by real estate wealth deciles 
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
Figure 11. Self-imposed constraints by real estate wealth 
deciles 
 
Source: ECRI, HFCS 
Policy solutions 
Policy-makers have two routes available to reduce credit rationing. The first is the use of 
monetary policy. The ECB engaged in non-standard monetary policy measures to 
increase the supply of money, hoping that the monetary transmission mechanism would 
turn this increased availability of money into real economic performance. Unfortunately, 
this only seems to have worked to a limited extent and monetary transmission 
encounters persistent problems. 
It seems that banks are hoarding funds for a variety of reasons, e.g. meeting the stricter 
Basel requirements or reducing their lending risk, so that the cheaper ECB money only 
partially reaches the real economy. As a consequence, these measures fail to create the 
full intended impact, yet the ECB believes they have still helped stem the downward flow 
of bank loan availability.21 The influence of improved bank funding is also indicated by 
the sharp decline in the number of SMEs indicating excessive interest rates as the reason 
for their failure to secure finance, as observed by Eurostat.22 Monetary policy therefore 
can only offer a partial solution, especially in times of financial economic stress. 
The second channel through which policy-makers can aspire to reduce credit rationing is 
collateral law, i.e. trying to remove the final blockages at the end of the circuit that are 
keeping the blood from flowing into the extremities. Demanding security in collateral 
changes the game for lenders in a number of different ways. First of all, it allows lenders 
to set the interest rate more accurately because it both conveys information about the 
underlying credit risk of the borrower and moves risk to assets rather than businesses, 
which are often easier to assess.  
                                                             
21 ECB (2013b), op. cit., p. 9. 
22Access to finance statistics – Statistics explained, p4, Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Access_to_finance_statistics#). 
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The information conveyance function of collateral aims at the heart of the adverse 
selection problem. The basis of this problem is lenders’ inability to distinguish borrowers 
according to risk. If, however, borrowers can be perfectly sorted, there will be no 
rationing.23 This information can be obtained using the contract terms of the credit offer 
as a screening mechanism. One of the terms suitable for use as a screening mechanism is 
the collateral or guarantee requirement the loan applicant will have to fulfil. If these 
terms are designed in such a way that borrowers reveal their risk type through their 
choice of contract, without giving any borrowers an incentive to misrepresent their type 
(incentive compatibility), the choice of contract can serve as an information conveyance 
mechanism.24 
The typical contract used in this context is the personal guarantee or surety, which takes 
roughly the same shape in all European jurisdictions. However, the efficacy of this 
instrument has been reduced in recent years by various types of consumer legislation all 
across Europe.25 While this legislation is inspired by legitimate concerns of protecting 
non-professional sureties, who are less well suited to assess the risks associated with a 
surety agreement, it is imperative that the surety or personal guarantee remains able to 
perform its essential function – supporting the granting of credit. Overly protective 
legislation could paralyse the provision of credit to households and to SMEs, especially to 
micro firms, and drive players to circumvention efforts that are even less efficient for all 
parties.26 
An important example of the information conveyance function in the financing of SMEs 
is the requirement for guarantees by insiders, typically directors or owners of the 
borrowing company. These insiders have better information about the borrowing 
company’s prospects than the lender, and requiring them to post personal guarantees 
disincentivises them from misrepresenting their type. In addition to this signalling 
function, requiring such guarantees also aligns incentives after the loan has been 
granted, as will be further explained below. If properly designed, the above-mentioned 
protective consumer legislation will not interfere with this function when it comes to 
SME finance,27 as it is usually not meant to target sureties in support of business loans.   
                                                            
23 Bester, op. cit., p. 895. 
24 A. Berger and G. Udell (1990), “Collateral, loan quality and bank risk”, The Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 24; Bester, op. cit., p. 891; D. Besanko and A. Thakor (1987), “Collateral and Rationing: 
Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets”, International Economic Review, Vol. 28, 
No. 3, p. 677. 
25 For general notes and references on the various types of non-professional surety protection, see U. 
Drobnig (ed.) (2007), Principles of European Law. Personal Security, Munich: Sellier.  
26 F. Helsen (2013), “Gewone en kosteloze borgtocht. Rechtseconomische doorlichting”, NJW, afl. 292, p. 
881. 
27 Initially, however, there was some uncertainty regarding the scope of these provisions in Belgium, which 
was fortunately resolved by the Cour de Cassation (ibid., p. 877) 
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Conclusions 
European-wide data concerning both companies and households indicate that the credit 
rationing phenomenon, which had been predicted by theory, does in fact occur to a 
significant degree in the European credit market. As far as companies are concerned, 
SME’s are most vulnerable and the current economic crisis has only made these 
concerns more pressing. 
The data show that the macroeconomic, top-down use of the monetary transmission 
mechanism alone is insufficient to counter the problem. The other solution consists of a 
bottom-up, microeconomic stimulation of lending transactions by focusing on collateral 
and guarantees. In this respect, it is imperative that these tools be designed in 
conformity with their underlying economic functions and mechanisms. When adopting 
protective consumer legislation, for example, it is therefore important to weigh the 
possible adverse effects on the availability of credit against the envisioned benefits. 
The first interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the surveys on households and 
SMEs is that anticipative self-exclusion from the credit market is a significant 
phenomenon. As households have a more homogeneous capital structure than SMEs, 
disaggregation along the lines of their primary sources of wealth made sense, showing 
that both bank-imposed and self-imposed credit rationing follow theoretical predictions, 
and that households are able to assess their chances fairly accurately.  
Indeed, the data confirm the high importance that lenders attach to collateral and 
guarantees when making their lending decisions. As a consequence, we would argue that 
those parts of the law governing security interests and guarantees should be the primary 
target for government policy aimed at improving the flow of blood in the economy, 
while not preventing consumers from receiving due protection.  
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